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Blessed Are the Forgetful: Utilitarianism and Remarriage in
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind
This paper considers two different kinds of philosophical interpretations of the movie Eternal 
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind. On the one hand, Christopher Grau1 and Thomas Wartenberg2 have 
interpreted Eternal Sunshine as a thought experiment that can function as an argument against 
utilitarianism. On the other hand, David Edelstein,3 Anthony Oliver Scott,4 Michael Meyer,5 and 
William Day6 have traced Eternal Sunshine back to genre of the remarriage comedy, which has 
been theorized by Stanley Cavell.7 I will argue that these two kinds of interpretations are in conflict.
More specifically, Eternal Sunshine, understood as a comedy of remarriage, cannot function as an 
argument against utilitarianism, at least in the sense specified by Grau and Wartenberg. Finally, I 
will suggest a different way in which Eternal Sunshine, understood as a comedy of remarriage, 
might function as an argument against utilitarianism.
Grau considers the utilitarian thesis according to which “the right action is the one that brings 
about the most happiness overall, where happiness is understood in terms of pleasure and the 
avoidance of pain” (p. 120).8 He compares the kind of memory machine that we see at work in 
Eternal Sunshine to the experience machine imagined by Robert Nozick in his famous thought 
experiment.9 More specifically, since Grau acknowledges that “the procedure as displayed in the 
film does not tend to maximize happiness overall”,10 he treats the actual memory machine we see in 
Eternal Sunshine as a flawed instance of an ideal memory machine, which, if properly instantiated, 
shall maximize happiness overall: “Putting aside the glitches and complications present in the film, 
it is natural to wonder: If memory removal was reliable, efficient, safe, and effective, are there still 
reasons to reject it?”.11 Just as Nozick’s experience machine “would give you any experience you 
desired”, the ideal memory machine would remove any memory you dislike. According to Grau, 
both the experience machine and the ideal memory machine involve “sacrificing knowledge of the 
truth for happiness”.12 As moral subjects, we are reluctant to sacrifice knowledge of the truth for the
sort of happiness warranted by such machines.
Such a  reluctance suggests that maximizing happiness is not necessarily our primary interest. 
Knowledge of the truth also matters for us, and so does contact with reality: “we value contact with 
reality in itself, independent of any benefits such contact may bring through pleasant experience: we
want to know we are experiencing the real thing”.13 Therefore, the ideal memory machine, just as 
the experience machine, shows us the inadequacy of the utilitarian claim that the best action is the 
one that maximizes the overall happiness. The contribution of a certain action to knowledge of the 
truth and to contact with reality is also to be taken into account in morally assessing this action. 
Wartenberg also interprets Eternal Sunshine as a thought experiment against utilitarianism, but
he proposes a slightly different line of reasoning. He begins by observing that: “Utilitarians take the
principle of utility – the claim that a social institution is justified if it contributes more than any
alternative  to  the  general  welfare  –  to  be  the  supreme  principle  of  morality”.14 From  this
perspective, he treats the use of the memory machine in the fictional world of Eternal Sunshine as a
practice which challenges the principle of utility. According to Wartenberg, the main reason why we
are reluctant to use the memory machine is that we do not find it right to leave the control of our
mind to external agents: “it is problematic for us to cede control over our minds to others, for we
then lack the means to regain control. It is the highly heteronymous nature of this practice for the
one undergoing it that marks it as so problematic for the film”.15 While Grau criticizes the memory
machine  by  highlighting  the  clash  between  the  pursuit  of  happiness  and  the  renunciation  of
knowledge, Waternberg does so by highlighting the clash between the pursuit of happiness and the
renunciation of agency. 
Still, if we treat Eternal Sunshine as a comedy of remarriage, the memory machine seems to be
capable of supporting the pursuit of happiness without requiring the renunciation of knowledge and
agency. Indeed, I will argue, the memory machine allows the characters to pursue happiness by
reaching a deeper level of knowledge about themselves and a more effective agency. 
In their  reviews of  Eternal  Sunshine, Edelstein and Scott  treat  the film as a  contemporary
instance of the comedy of remarriage. Edelstein writes: 
The philosopher Stanley Cavell has called the classic screwball movies like The Awful Truth
(1937) and  The Lady Eve (1941) ‛comedies of remarriage,’ in which couples are rudely
bounced from their Edenic connubial gardens and reunited (after a series of farcical/magical
contrivances) in a spirit of wry realism: This time they know they’ll live bumpily ever after.
In  Eternal  Sunshine  of  the  Spotless  Mind,  screenwriter  Charlie  Kaufman  teleports  the
screwball genre into the 21st century.16 
In a similar vein, Scott points out that “In the classic comedy of remarriage (Philadelphia Story may
be the most familiar example) the central couple recovers from the failure of their first union and
eventually,  after  various  humiliations  and  setbacks,  constitutes  a  more  perfect  one”,  and  he
concludes that “This is a pretty good summary of Eternal Sunshine”.17 
The insights that can be found in Edelstein’s and Scott’s popular reviews are further developed
in  two philosophical  papers,  one  by Meyer  and the  other  by Day.  Meyer  states  that  memory,
forgiveness and reconciliation are the key components of the comedy of remarriage, and in virtue of
its way of highlighting these elements “Eternal Sunshine is arguably the most instructive and also
the most canonical twenty-first-century comedy of remarriage”.18 Day points out the crucial role of
conversation in the comedy of remarriage and proposes to read “the middle of Eternal Sunshine as
an extravagant remarriage conversation between Joel and Clementine”.19 Although Meyer and Day
emphasize different components of remarriage, they ultimately agree in treating Eternal Sunshine as
a remarkable contemporary occurrence of the peculiar film genre discovered by Cavell. 
Grau himself, in note 3 of his essay, acknowledges that 
Eternal Sunshine seems to fit rather nicely within the genre of film that Stanley Cavell has
made famous with the label ‘Comedies of Remarriage.’ [...] Such films involve a separated
couple ultimately getting back together through rediscovering why they fell in love in the
first  place.  Eternal  Sunshine follows that  pattern,  but  with  the novel  twist  of  memory
removal facilitating the ‘reunion.’20
 
Yet, if we treat  Eternal Sunshine as a comedy of remarriage, the functioning of the movie as an
argument against utilitarianism can be undermined. In fact, the comedy of remarriage tells the story
of a man and a woman whose pursue of happiness depends on a process that involves failure and
break-up. Since in Eternal Sunshine the memory machine is an essential constituent of this process,
the best way for Joel and Clementine to pursue their happiness is to go through the experience of
the memory machine. 
To a certain extent, Grau and Wartenberg are right in claiming that Eternal Sunshine addresses
a utilitarian issue by treating the memory machine as a means to the end of happiness. Nevertheless,
both Grau and Wartenberg consider the wrong machine. They focus on an ideal memory machine
that would perfectly succeed in completely erasing the memories about the beloved. Yet, as both
Grau and Wartenberg acknowledge, this is not the machine that is at work in  Eternal Sunshine.
Instead, the film shows us a flawed machine, which may fail in completely erasing the memories
about the beloved. Indeed, in the case of Joel, the memory machine actually fails in fulfilling its
primary function. After the erasure process has finished, Joel is left with a piece of memory, the
word “Montauk”,  which  leads  him to take  a  train  and go to  the  place  in  which  he  will  meet
Clementine  again  on  Valentine’s  Day.  Arguably,  a  similar  failure  of  the  memory machine  also
occurs in the case of Clementine, since she also goes to Montauk on Valentine’s Day. 
Grau himself acknowledges this fact in note 4 of his paper, when he writes:
 …the technology as it  functions in the film (flaws and all) actually allows a couple to
reunite in a way that may not have been possible otherwise. It  is not clear whether this
reunion is a good thing (though many viewers, myself included, take it to be). Even if a
glitchy and incomplete memory removal brings about a happy result in this particular case,
however, this does not warrant an acceptance of the technology in general.21
 
Still,  such an  acknowledgment  can  function  as  the  starting  point  of  an  argument  leading  to  a
different conception of the role of utilitarianism in Eternal Sunshine. If (1) it is “the technology as it
functions in the film (flaws and all)”  that “ brings about a happy result in this particular case”; and
(2) this result maximizes happiness for Joel and Clem; then, at least in this particular case, (3) the
alternative  that  the  utilitarian  would  consider  the  best  way  to  happiness is  precisely  the  one
involving the use of the flawed memory machine. Therefore, if one wants to use Eternal Sunshine
as an argument against utilitarianism, one should challenge this alternative.22 
Premises (1) and (2),  from which conclusion (3) follows, rest  upon an account of  Eternal
Sunshine  as  a  comedy  of  remarriage.  According  to  such  an  account,  remarriage  maximizes
happiness for Joel and Clem given the crisis of their relationship. Yet, only the flawed memory
machine seems capable of making remarriage possible, since – given the situation presented in the
film – the ideal memory machine will lead Joel and Clem, at most, to a brand-new marriage, while
the refusal of any memory machine will bring them to an irreversible divorce. 
Thus,  given the story told in  Eternal  Sunshine,  the ideal  memory machine is  not the right
option from a utilitarian point of view, since it is not “the one that brings about the most happiness
overall”, in Grau’s words – or the one that “contributes more than any alternative to the general
welfare”, in Wartenberg’s words. There is an alternative that better contributes to the pursuit of
happiness,  and  to  remarriage,  and  this  alternative  is  the  flawed  memory machine,  that  is,  the
memory machine that we see at work in the movie. 
Since the flawed memory machine is the one that offers the best contribution to the pursuit of
happiness, if one wants to interpret Eternal Sunshine as an argument against utilitarianism, it is this
machine one should consider to be one’s target. It is against  this  machine that Grau’s argument
about knowledge and Wartenberg’s argument about agency should be addressed. Unlike the  ideal
memory machine, the actual, flawed memory machine can resist these arguments.  In order to make
this point, let us focus on the pursuit of happiness in the remarriage genre.  
According  to  Cavell,  the  pursuit  of  happiness  that  occurs  in  the  comedies  of  remarriage
requires that the man and the woman leave an original condition in which they are just like Adam
and Eve after the creation. In this sense, the story told by the comedy of remarriage can be seen as a
“trouble in paradise” tale,23 that is, as “some comic version of the story of the expulsion from the
Garden of Eden”.24 In order to move from the condition of marriage to that of remarriage, the man
and the woman should undergo the temptation and eat the apple that will lead them to be chased
from the Garden of Eden. As Cavell puts it, “the woman has probably started the [process] with
something called an apple, anyway by presenting a temptation”.25 
In Eternal Sunshine, the apple, the temptation originally presented by the woman, is precisely
the memory machine. Only eating the apple can enable the hero and the heroine to achieve the
changing they need. As Cavell puts it, “…this changing is  the forgoing or forgetting of the past
state and its impasse of vengefulness”.26 
Cavell  traces  the  changes  that  characters  undergo  in  the  remarriage  comedy  back  to  the
changing that occurs in the Shakespearean romance, which “deals in marvelous events and solves
its  problems  through  metamorphoses  and  recognition  scenes  –  through,  in  other  words,
transformations of perception” (p. 48).27 In the tradition of romance, as well as in the remarriage
comedy,  such metamorphoses  and transformations require  “the action’s  moving from a starting
place of impasse to a place Frye calls ‘the green world,’ a place in which perspective and renewal
are to be achieved” (p. 48).28 
In Eternal Sunshine the role of the “green world” is played by the inner world that the memory
machine  makes accessible  to  Joel  (and arguably also to  Clementine,  though the  film does  not
directly show that). Day emphasizes this correspondence when he writes: “In classical Hollywood
remarriage comedies  featuring couples of sufficient  wealth and Manhattan addresses,  the green
world is  given the name ‛Connecticut.’ In  Eternal  Sunshine,  this  mythical  locale  gets  renamed
‛Joel’s head’” (pp. 140-141).29 In particular, Day focuses on the green world as a suitable space for
“the uniquely human and uniquely philosophical  form of  intercourse  we call  conversation”  (p.
134),30 noting that in the case of Joel and Clem, “their conversation of desire is nowhere if not in the
kaleidoscopic center of the film, in the scenes that take place in Joel’s head” (p. 135).31
However, such a conversation also has a darker side. As Cavell points out, in the green world
“the mind or plot will not only be cleared and restored, it will be darkened and frozen” (p. 49).32
This situation, indeed, precisely occurs in the inner world made accessible by the memory machine
in Eternal Sunshine. Furthermore, Cavell states that the master of the green world is a father figure,
which is endowed “with the power, or to use Shakespeare’s words, the art of magic” (p. 49).33 For
instance,  in  The Tempest  the green world has been set  up and is  ruled by Prospero,  “the most
famous of Shakespeare’s father-magicians” (p. 50).34 Likewise, in Eternal Sunshine, a similar role
of “father-magician” is played by Doctor Howard Mierzwiak, the inventor of the memory machine. 
Still, the analogy that connects the Shakespearean romance and the comedy of remarriage to
Eternal Sunshine lies not only in the crossing of the green world ruled by the father-magician, but
also in the upshot of this crossing. What is so wonderful about these tales of remarriage is “the
nature of the forgiving and forgetting asked for at the conclusion of romantic comedy” (p. 51, my
emphasis).35 In  Eternal  Sunshine,  the  memory  machine,  invented  by  the  father-magician  Dr.
Mierzwiak, provides Joel and Clementine with the analogue of a green world, which leads them to a
condition of forgiving and forgetting each other that enables their willingness to try it again. The
memory machine attempts to erase memories, thereby forcing Joel (and arguably also Clementine,
though the film does not show that) to revisit them. In so doing, the memory machine allows Joel
(and Clementine) to reach a different perspective, one that permits a renewal.
More  specifically,  the  memory  machine  allows  Joel  to  elaborate  his  memory  through
imagination, thereby grafting wishes concerning the future onto memories concerning the past (as it
can  happen in  certain  dreams,  but,  here,  with a  much higher  degree of  self-consciousness).  In
particular, Joel relives the memories of his childhood and grafts the figure of Clementine onto them.
In this  way,  he expresses a wish that  according to Cavell  is  crucial  in the remarriage comedy:
“almost without exception these films allow the principal pair to express the wish to be children
again, or perhaps to be children together”.36 
The richness of Joel’s imaginations and wishes, and their interaction with his memories, show
that the memory machine does not cause an immediate erasure. Rather, it pursues its own effect
through  a  process  that  challenges  the  subject’s  resistance.  The  machine  tries  to  erase  Joel’s
memories of Clementine, while letting Joel resist this process, and Clementine herself, as a creature
of memory, becomes an ally of Joel in this challenge.37 Thus, Joel does not completely lose agency
during the process. He is prevented from carrying out bodily movements, but he can still perform
mental acts. He remains an intentional subject. In a certain sense, his intentionality functions better
than  ever,  since  he  can  introspect  with  more  perspicuity than  ever.  His  decision  to  resist  total
erasure of Clementine allows him to retain what he does. 
In virtue of the experience provided by the machine, Joel discovers that what he really wants is
not to leave Clementine, but to stay with her. Arguably, if Joel  had not challenged  the memory
machine, he  would not have discovered  this  truth  about himself. Nevertheless, he  does challenge
this machine and does discover this truth. Therefore, he does not sacrifice agency and knowledge in
order to pursue happiness. Rather, he performs subtler mental acts, and reaches a deeper knowledge
of himself, that helps him in his pursuit of happiness.38 
Of course, the challenge involves a risk. The memory machine could have done its job, thereby
leading Joel  to  fully  forget  Clementine  and to  never  meet  her  again  in  his  life.  Yet,  from the
perspective of  Eternal Sunshine, this is a risk that is worth taking: this is probably the only way
available to resurrect the love relationship between Joel and Clementine. In Cavell’s terms, Joel’s
head was the only “green world” at their disposal, and they had to cross it, even if the crossing
involves the risk of a permanent separation. Indeed, refusing to cross the green world would involve
not the risk but the certainty of separation. 
If we consider the memory machine in  Eternal Sunshine not only as a technical device but
more generally as an institution, whose name in the film is “Lacuna, Inc.”, there is another sense in
which the memories are not fully erased. In fact, the memory machine is aimed at erasing “primary
memories” in the mind of the patient, while “secondary memories” stored in material objects are
preserved, though only in archives that are no longer available to the patients. In particular, such
secondary memories consist of writings, drawings, gifts, and a tape on which the patient records a
confession telling the reason why he or she has decided to undergo the memory erasure. 
At the end of  Eternal Sunshine, Mary, the secretary of Lacuna, Inc., introduces an important
amendment to the functioning of the memory machine as an institution. She does so by sending all
the patients their archives of personal memorabilia. This is the last crucial step in the process of
remarriage carried out by Joel  and Clementine.  The memory machine has erased their  primary
memories about their shared past, but now they can rediscover it through secondary memories. The
definitive reconciliation of Joel and Clementine occurs precisely while the cassette player plays a
tape in which Joel explains the reason why he did not love Clementine anymore. As Day puts it,
“The words on these tapes are part of their remarriage conversation” (p. 148).39
If  this  is  right,  we can  challenge Grau’s  account  of  what  (by referring  to  the secretary of
Lacuna, Inc.) he calls “Mary’s theft”: 
From a strictly utilitarian perspective it might seem obvious that Mary is doing something
morally  wrong  in  returning  those  files,  mementos,  and  audiotapes.  Surely  she  will  be
causing many of the previous patients pain and perhaps even intense, prolonged suffering.
Why,  then,  does  she  think  she  is  “in  the  right,”  and  why  does  the  audience  tend  to
sympathize with her actions? I have been suggesting in this essay that there are a variety of
ways in which we can think of the memory-removal procedure as causing significant harm
through deprivation. Mary is attempting to undo that harm, and even if her attempt brings
with it some “harms that wound,” we (and she) are inclined to think the suffering might well
be worth it.40 
At least with respect to the case of Joel and Clementine, “[f]rom a strictly utilitarian perspective” it
does  not “seem  obvious”  that  Mary  is  doing  something  morally  wrong  in  returning  their
memorabilia.  Indeed,  she  gives  them the  opportunity  to  turn  their  brand-new  marriage  into  a
ultimately  happier  remarriage.  The  pain  and  suffering  Mary causes  to  Joel  and  Clementine  is
nothing but a mean to the end of a greater happiness. The reason why Mary contributes to Joel and
Clementine’s pursuit of happiness is that she turns the flawed memory machine into an  amended
memory machine,  which does not destroy the memories but ultimately purges them from those
negative emotions that prevented the subjects to see them in the proper light. By relying on the
distinction introduced by Endel Tulving,41 we may say that the amended memory machine purifies
memory by turning first-person “episodic” or “experiential” memories into third-person “semantic”
or “propositional” memories. The latter just give us information about a past episode whereas the
former make us relive the episode from inside. For example, one has just semantic memory of his or
her birth whereas arguably has episodic memory of the birth of his or her child. Julia Driver (2009)
highlights  the  relevance  of  this  distinction  in  Eternal  Sunshine, calling  “description”  or
“information” the semantic memory and simply “memory” the episodic memory: 
Joel is told about his past with Clementine via Mary’s revelations. So he knows that the man
in love with Clementine was himself. But instead of knowing via memory, he knows via a
description of a situation he used to remember. It is like the knowledge of the past someone
gets looking through a very old photo album. “That was me in the picture playing with the
kitten, but I have no memory of it.” Thus, Joel has information about his past, but no first-
person knowledge of it, since he is lacking the memory of it.42
The purification of memory that the amended memory machine enables in  Eternal Sunshine
can be better understood by considering what Valerie Tiberius, in her philosophical analysis of the
movie, calls “the three Joels”.43 First, there is a “bitter” Joel, who is under influence of powerful
angry emotions; second, a “spotless” Joel who has had memories completely erased; and, finally, a
“sadder  but  wiser”  Joel,  who  has  had  his  memories  erased  but  has  somehow recovered  them
through  listening  to  the  returned  tapes.  Tiberius  wonders  which  Joel  is  best  placed  to  make
decisions and she suggests that it  is sadder but wiser Joel,  since bitter  Joel is overwhelmed by
negative emotions, while spotless Joel lacks crucial information. “Sadder but wiser” Joel became
wiser precisely by virtue of the amended memory machine, which has turned his episodic memories
into semantic memories. 
By undergoing the amended memory machine, Joel and Clementine consider their past affair as
they might consider an affair that involved two other persons. On closer inspection, this is precisely
the attitude they should learn to adopt towards  their old selves since, according to the process of
remarriage, they need to become a new man and a new woman. Turning an episodic memory into a
semantic memory is not necessarily a loss of knowledge. On the contrary, it could lead us to better
place the events recorded by this  memory in the proper perspective,  without being excessively
influenced by our emotional involvement in those events. In this sense, Eternal Sunshine suggests
an  interesting  way  to  make  sense  of  Nietzsche’s  sentence  that  is  quoted  twice  in  the  movie:
“Blessed are the forgetful, for they get the better even of their blunders.” From the perspective of
Eternal Sunshine, the forgetful are blessed (and can get the better even of their blunders) if they
forget  their  episodic  memories,  drenched  as  they  are  with  negative  emotions,  but  retain  their
semantic memories. As Daniel Shaw puts it in his analysis of Nietzschean themes in the film: “we
must transform our attitude from a regretful ‘It was’ to an ecstatic ‘Thus I will it so’. ”(2011, p.
263)44
The idea that the amended memory machine ultimately improves the quality of Joel’s memories
is implicitly at work in Meyer’s reading of  Eternal Sunshine as a remarriage comedy, especially
when he describes the ending scenes of the film as imbued with “a spirit of memory, forgiveness,
and  reconciliation”45 Meyer’s  point  is  that  remarriage  requires  reconciliation,  which  requires
forgiveness, which requires memory. He characterizes the memory that Joel shares with Clementine
at the end of the film as “a solid memory of past troubles”, “an uncompromised memory of past
difficulty” which leads Joel to “a higher and more trustworthy level of self-awareness” (p. 83).46
Yet, in Eternal Sunshine, such a solid and uncompromised memory, which ultimately grounds the
reconciliation between Joel and Clementine, is the memory that has been emotionally purged by the
amended memory machine. 
If this is right, the amended memory machine is not incompatible with Grau’s emphasis on the
value that we ascribe to knowledge, since this machine allows patients to reach a deeper knowledge
about their own inner nature, in spite of the loss of episodic memories. Neither is the amended
memory machine incompatible with Wartenberg’s emphasis on the value that we ascribe to agency,
since  this  machine challenges patients in a game of self-exploration and change that leaves them
room to  maneuver.  Given that  this  machine,  in  Eternal  Sunshine,  is  the  one  that  warrants  the
maximization of Joel and Clementine’s happiness, and given that this machine leaves room for
knowledge and agency, we can conclude that  Eternal Sunshine  does not function as an argument
against utilitarianism, at least not as an argument of the sorts that Grau and Wartenberg consider. 
To sum up,  Eternal Sunshine is not necessarily an argument  against utilitarianism, but rather
can best be seen as an argument within utilitarianism. At least in the case of Joel and Clementine,
the alternative that contributes more than any other to the pursuit of happiness is neither the ideal
memory machine  that  would  completely erase  memory leading them,  at  most,  to  a  brand-new
marriage  nor  the  rejection  of  whatever  kind  of  memory machine  that  would  lead  them to  an
irreversible divorce. Instead, the alternative that, according to Eternal Sunshine, maximizes Joel and
Clementine’s happiness by leading them to remarriage is a flawed and amended memory machine
that purges memory from negative emotions by turning episodic memories into semantic memories.
An attempt to use  Eternal Sunshine  as an argument against utilitarianism should show that  this
machine, which actually maximizes happiness, clashes with our moral intuitions about knowledge
and agency. In this paper, I have argued that this machine, unlike the ideal memory machine, does
not clash with our intuitions about knowledge and agency. That is because this machine provides
the  patients  with  some  relevant  agency,  allowing  them to  challenge  the  machine  itself  and  to
achieve some deeper knowledge about themselves thereby. In short, the amended memory machine
provides the patients with a process of learning.
Eternal Sunshine emphasizes the relevance of learning by means of the song Everybody’s Got
to Learn Sometime, which consists of four verses: “Change your heart, look around you / Change
your heart, it will astound you / I need your loving like the sunshine / And everybody’s gotta learn
sometime”. This song appears twice in the movie, once at the beginning and once at the end. We
first hear it during the opening credits, when Joel is listening to it in his car just after discovering
that  Clementine  has  erased  her  memories  about  him.  Yet  when  the  song  reaches  the  refrain
“everybody’s gotta learn sometime” Joel stops the radio and throws the tape out of the car window.
He is still not in the proper condition to change and learn. Nevertheless, the song reappears just
after the definitive reconciliation of Joel and Clementine, thereby accompanying the last sequence
of the movie. 
This sequence consists of three repetitions of the same scene, in which Joel and Clementine run
happily on the snow-covered beach of Montauk. In reviewing a collection of philosophical essays
about Eternal Sunshine, Carl Plantinga (2010) complains that one essay that focuses on the movie’s
ending “fails to note the representation and overlapping of the same shot of Clem and Joel playing
in the snow” (p. 419).47 Plantinga adds that “Although various essayists offer interpretations of the
film’s perspective on Joel and Clem’s prospects for the future, none mention this very important
shot sequence, coming as it does at the end of the film” (p. 419).48 
One way of interpreting this sequence is to say it implies that Joel and Clem are destined to
repeat indefinitely the process of remarriage that the movie has showed. They will  quarrel  and
separate  again,  and  then  go do  Lacuna,  Inc.  to  erase  their  memories  again,  and  then  meet  in
Montauk again, and so on and so forth. Likewise, as we discover in the course of the film, Mary, the
secretary of Lacuna, Inc., endlessly repeats her love affair with Doctor Mierzwiak. According to this
interpretation, the memory machine risks leading Joel and Clementine into a degraded version of
Nietzsche’s “eternal recurrence of the same” instead of to a degraded version of Pope’s “eternal
sunshine of the spotless mind.”.  In Pope’s poem Eloisa to Abelard, the “eternal sunshine of the
spotless mind” is a divine gift to Eloise (“How happy is the blameless vestal’s lot! / The world
forgetting, by the world forgot. / Eternal sunshine of the spotless mind! / Each pray’r accepted, and
each wish resign’d”) whereas in the movie this boils down to the brute outcome of a machine.
Likewise,  in  Nietzsche’s  The  Gay  Science the  “eternal  recurrence  of  the  same”  is  the  exact
repetition of a whole life (“This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once
more and innumerable times more”) whereas in the movie this boils down to a whole life consisting
in a repetition of episodes of the same kind.49
If this is right, there is another sense in which Eternal Sunshine can be treated as an argument
against utilitarianism. As seen above, we find it acceptable to challenge a memory machine if this
challenge can allow us to deploy a subtler form of agency and to reach a deeper level of knowledge.
Yet, in accepting this peculiar learning process, we conceive of learning as a step towards moral
progress,  not  as  an ephemeral  phase that  will  be soon replaced by a  phase of  unlearning.  The
remarriage at stake must be something more than an ephemeral link between a past divorce and a
future divorce. If the ending of  Eternal Sunshine involves nothing but this, we are left with the
impression  that  there  is  something  morally  wrong  in  it,  in  spite  of  the  happiness  of  Joel  and
Clementine. It is not just that Joel and Clementine will suffer again in the future. In fact, from an
utilitarian perspective, such a further suffering can be justified by considering the further happiness
of the further remarriage to which it will lead. It is the lack of true progress, of durable learning, in
spite of the maximization of happiness, that strikes us as something unjust. 
Indeed, Eternal Sunshine, so understood, would no longer be a proper comedy of remarriage,
since  Cavell  conceives  of  the  pursuit  of  happiness  in  remarriage  comedies  as  a  sort  of  moral
progress, which in his later book Cities of Words (2004) he will call “moral perfectionism”.50 But
there is  no progress in  the indefinite  repetition of  the same patterns  of  behavior.  An indefinite
alternation between remarriage and divorce cannot make room for “the new creation of the human”
(Cavell  1980,  p.  140).51 If  Joel  and Clementine’s  indefinitely repeated  happiness  at  the end of
Eternal Sunshine  strikes  us as something that  brings about  the most happiness overall,  without
involving true moral progress, maybe we have found a new way of reading Eternal Sunshine as an
argument against utilitarianism.52 
   Enrico Terrone
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